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 In a reanalysis of data used by Jacobs and Carmichael (2002), we found that a key 
theoretical variable (presence of black mayors) was unrelated to killings of police once a correction 
was made to Jacobs and Carmichael’s (hereafter J&C) incorrect specification of the exposure 
variable. The presence of black mayors continued to be noncontributory when we used a larger 
sample of cities and more recent data (see Kaminski & Stucky, 2009). Jacobs (this issue) critiques 
our analysis on methodological and theoretical grounds and presents evidence that the presence of 
black mayors is statistically significant when a nonlinear specification of the percentage of the 
population that is divorced is included in his models. In response, we first address Jacobs’ 
theoretical critique by showing that there is, in fact, ample justification for including a measure of 
the racial composition of city councils. We then show that even after revising our models based on 
Jacobs’ methodological critique we continue to find that the presence of black mayors is 
noncontributory, calling into question the robustness of J&C’s and Jacobs’ findings.  
 
Racial Politics: Black Mayors v. Black City Councils 
 Jacobs argues in his reply that our original article did not provide sufficient justification for 
the inclusion of the percent of the city council that is Black.  In J&C’s article the justification for 
including the Black mayor variable was the argument (citing Bobo & Gilliam, 1990) that increased 
black political efficacy would accompany such visible evidence of black political incorporation and 
reduce feelings of black injustice.1  This, in turn, would lead to fewer killings of police officers.  
J&C acknowledge that such an argument is unable to be tested directly using ecological data.  In his 
comment, Jacobs claims that most people are unaware of politics and therefore would be unlikely to 
know the race of their city council member.  In addition, he claims that our citations co-mingled the 
1 It should also be noted that Bobo and Gilliam (1990) used the General Social Survey and the unit of analysis was 
primary sampling units (PSU) rather than cities.  In addition, the dummy variable for the Black mayor was coded as 1 
when the mayor of the major city in the PSU was Black but not when the mayor of lesser cities within the PSU was 
Black. 
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effects of city councils and mayors and probably reflected the contribution of Black mayors.  
Therefore, the inclusion of the black city council variable was not justified.   
 In retrospect, one might read the language of our justification in our original article as co-
mingling citations of the effects of Black mayors and Black city council on politics, policy, and 
criminal justice.  Here, we briefly clarify these issues.  One set of studies that we pointed to in the 
original article considered the relationship between racial political representation and racial 
representation patterns in municipal employees. Several studies have separately included both the 
race of the mayor and the percentage of the city council members who are black in their 
explanations of racial variation in municipal employment (e.g. Mladenka, 1989, 1991; Kerr & 
Mladenka, 1994).  Though not unequivocal, these studies suggest that greater Black city council 
representation is associated with increased black municipal employment, particularly protective 
service employment, which would include police (Dye & Renick, 1981, Mladenka, 1989, 1991).  
Indeed, Kerr and Mldenka (1994) conclude that racial composition of the city council is more 
important than the race of the mayor in their pooled cross sectional time series analyses of 
municipal employment.  One could argue that the racial composition of the police force would be a 
highly visible indicator of racial incorporation to citizens irrespective of their general political 
knowledge.  Therefore, if black city council representation produces greater black municipal 
employment, black political efficacy could be enhanced or feelings that the police are an occupying 
force (especially in large cities with high levels of segregation) could be reduced.  Such an 
atmosphere could be associated with fewer killings of police by blacks.   
 Though no studies we are aware of directly address the question of whether black political 
efficacy is related to black city council representation as the Bobo and Gilliam study does for black 
mayors, one study does indirectly address this question.  Bledsoe (1986) finds that black political 
efficacy is higher in cities with district city council elections than those with at-large (where voters 
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from all over the city choose council members) elections.  He argues that this is likely due to the 
increased ability to have black city council members elected in district cities.  Indeed, many studies 
have shown that black city council representation is higher in cities with district-based elections (e.g. 
Welch, 1988, 1990).   
 Other criminal justice studies have also independently included the racial composition of the 
city council.  Shihadeh and Flynn (1996) included the racial composition of the city council in their 
study using similar arguments to those we included in our original article.  In a forthcoming article, 
Stucky finds that the racial composition of the city council and the race of the mayor separately (but 
conditionally depending on the racial composition of the city) influence black violent crime arrest 
rates in 100 cities in 1970, 1980, and 1990.  Thus, there is ample theoretical justification for the 
separate inclusion of both the racial composition of the city council and the race of the mayor. 
Nonlinear Specification of Percent Divorced 
 In his comment, Jacobs points out that “…K&S do not replicate any of our seven ‘main’ 
comprehensive models. We found evidence that an important social disorganization variable—
percent divorced—had a significant nonlinear relationship with officers killed. But K&S 
inexplicably omit our or another specification that captures this nonlinear relationship” (pp. 2-3). 
First, we never claimed to conduct a full replication of J&C and, in fact, we stated specifically that 
we conducted a limited replication of J&C (K&S, 2009, p. 17, note 3) and extension. Second, it is 
unclear to us, despite J&C’s arguments, why they went to such great lengths to specify a nonlinear 
relationship for percent divorced using dummy variable coding when the black mayor variable was 
statistically significant when percent divorced was entered linearly in an earlier model. In his 
comment, Jacobs states that it “…follows that when the K&S omission [to enter percent divorced 
nonlinearly] is corrected the black mayor dummy remains highly statistically significant in all main 
models in Table 1 that include dummies to capture the nonlinear relationship between divorce rates 
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and officers killed” (p. 4). However, as shown in Table 2 (p. 1236) of J&C’s original paper, this was 
not the case. As Models 2 and 3 in their Table 2 show, the black mayor variable was statistically 
significant when percent divorced was entered linearly and J&C presumably could not have known 
at the time that the contribution of the presence of black mayors completely depended on the 
inclusion of a nonlinear specification of percent divorced once their misspecification of the 
exposure variable was corrected.  We were unaware of this unique dependency as well, and when 
J&C’s black mayor variable became statistically insignificant after we corrected their 
misspecification of the exposure variable (K&S, Table 1, Model 2), we simply presumed it became 
noncontributory due to the exposure variable correction and never suspected that the effect of the 
black mayor variable would be so sensitive to a nonlinear specification of percent divorced.  This is 
a second reason we did not include a nonlinear specification for percent divorced.2 
 According to J&C, the rationale for using the dummy variable coding was that “[t]he 
residuals suggest that nonlinear effects remain and the first three models do not pass the link test for 
specification error (Pregibon 1980). In model 4 we test a solution by retaining the divorce rate after 
we add dummy variables scored 1 depending on where a city placed in the five quintiles on the 
percentage divorced” (p. 1235).3 However, all of J&C’s tests and diagnostics were based on 
misspecified models (due to their misspecification of the exposure variable), and thus Jacobs’ 
subsequent discovery that that the black mayor effect, in fact, depends on the inclusion of a 
nonlinear specification of percent divorced is based on flawed analyses.4  
2 We also stated that the dataset we received did not include all the variables necessary to replicate all of J&C’s models 
(K&S, 2009:17, note 3). This was an oversight on our part. 
3 Oddly, when we exactly replicate those models using their incorrect exposure command, Models 2 and 3 pass the link 
test for misspecification (b = -.079; p = .051 and b = -.062; p = .108, respectively). We also point out that formally, the 
link is not a test of the misspecification of explanatory variables; instead, it is a test of the misspecification of the 
dependent variable (StataCorp, 2009, pp. 849-851). 
4 Reestimating J&C’s first three models using the correct offset command shows that Models 2 and 3 in their Table 2 do 
not come close to failing the link test (b = -.032; p = .377 and b = -.022; p = .515, respectively). 
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 Regarding the nonlinear specification of the percent divorced variable, J&C stated that 
“[t]his control variable is not of theoretical interest, so we maximize its explanatory power by using 
dummy coding without justifying the functional form of this relationship” (p. 1232). Thus, the 
significance of the effect of the black mayor variable in Jacobs’ analysis depended on an arbitrary 
coding of percent divorced. It is arbitrary in that the functional form is without theoretical 
justification. Instead, J&C based its functional form on the maximization of explanatory power, 
which capitalizes on chance.5 This fact, plus that that their justification for dummy coding percent 
divorced was based on misspecified models to begin with, indicates that the contribution of the 
presence of black mayors is based more on “accident” than on design. As we will show again, the 
relationship between black mayors and killings of police appears not to be particularly robust.  
Addressing Additional Critiques 
 J&C included the presence of black mayors in 1980 to predict murders of police aggregated 
over the years 1981 – 1990 and Jacobs correctly points out that most of our explanatory variables 
are based on 1989 or 1990 data while our dependent variable consists of police officers murdered 
aggregated for the years 1985 – 1995. Although this precluded establishment of temporal ordering, 
we never presumed to be estimating anything other than a correlational model. As such, we thought 
it best to anchor the independents in the middle of the distribution of the dependent variable, though 
we recognize the validity of Jacobs’ point and revise the model accordingly to test whether or not it 
makes a difference. 
Jacobs (p. 7) implies that his single-year measure of the presence of black mayor is superior 
to one that captures more fully the actual number of years a black mayor is in office. However, as 
5 We also find it odd that J&C chose to focus on dummy variable coding only for percent divorced, which was not of 
theoretical interest, particularly when theoretical justification exists for including nonlinear effects for other important 
variables in their models that were entered linearly (see, e.g., K&S, 2009:10-11).  
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we pointed out in our original article (K&S, 2009, p. 11), mayoral terms can vary substantially, 
lasting a year, several years, or a decade or more. J&C’s use of a single-year dummy indicator fails 
to capture this variability, casting serious doubt on the validity of such a simplistic measure. Further, 
J&C’s single-year measure is unable to capture the situation in which a black mayor in 1980 was 
followed by a change to a nonblack mayor (or vice versa) during the decade over which their 
dependent variable is measured.  Oddly, J&C and Jacobs are silent on this issue and we encourage 
researchers to move beyond the use of simplistic single-year dichotomous measures of the presence 
of a black mayor.  
 Jacobs indicates that “…K&S only include one dummy variable for the Northeast; it would 
be more convincing if their findings persisted after they entered three dummies to capture the 
effects of all four Census regions as we did” (p. 7). We refer readers to note 13 of our original paper 
where we stated that “[a]dditional analyses showed that the effect of city location in the South on 
police homicides was no different from city location in the West or Midwest; hence, our decision to 
contrast these regions with the Northeast.” Nevertheless, we include them in analyses below to 
demonstrate that it makes no difference regarding the lack of the contribution of the black mayor 
variable. 
 As further evidence for the significance of black mayors, Jacobs (p. 7) references a paper by 
Kent (2010) that is forthcoming in Homicide Studies. According to Jacobs, Kent employs a panel 
model based on 1980, 1990, and 2000 data and finds that cities with black mayors had fewer police 
killings. Although we have not seen the paper by Kent, we agree that panel models offer several 
important advantages over cross sectional models and we look forward to seeing Kent’s results in 
print. However, if Kent’s manuscript is based on her dissertation in which she analyzed killings of 
police using a panel model design, additional work may be required before we can conclude that the 
presence of black mayors reduces police killings. This is because the Law Enforcement Officers 
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Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) electronic data available from the University of Michigan’s Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research that Kent relied on for her analysis (Kent, 
2005, p. 98) contained some large errors in the counts of officers killed.  Kaminski inadvertently 
discovered these errors during a cursory review of the electronic data.6 For example, the ICPSR 
version of the LEOKA data reports 17 San Francisco officers killed in November of 1982 alone, 
whereas other electronic data that Kaminski obtained upon special request directly from the FBI as 
well as the FBI’s hard copy 1982 LEOKA report indicate only one officer killed in San Francisco 
that year. As another example, the ICPSR version of the data indicate that 12 law enforcement 
officers were murdered in Oklahoma City in April 1995 (the same month the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building was bombed), but the hardcopy LEOKA report does not mention the deaths of any 
local law enforcement officers in that month.  
     Kent aggregated killings of police for the years 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2001-02 and unless the 
error was noticed and corrected, the first wave of data includes the erroneous San Francisco count. 
This would almost certainly affect her estimates, especially since her dependent variable included 
very few murders (31, 20, and 9 in each wave of data, respectively) (Kent, 2005, p. 107). In any 
case, the implications of these and other likely errors in the ICPSR versions of the LEOKA data are 
unknown and additional analyses using corrected data will be required before Kent’s findings 
regarding the effect of the presence of black mayors can be confirmed.7 
6 Kaminski reported these errors to both the ICPSR and the FBI several months ago, though what additional errors have 
been found and corrected is unknown.    
7 We should also mention that we were unable to determine the source of J&C’s dependent variable (we only know they 
say they use counts of local police killed (see p. 1231). We caution that the counts in the electronic versions of the 
LEOKA data from ICPSR apparently include local, state and federal law enforcement officers murdered within local 
jurisdictions (e.g., federal officers killed in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma). 
Unless researchers take steps to exclude state and federal officers killed in cities, they may be included in the dependent 
variable. We argue they should not be included, given their very different functions, not to mention that the exposure 
variables used by us, J&C, Jacobs, and Kent are based on the number of sworn officers in municipal police departments.  
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 On page 4 of Jacobs’ comment, he states “[a]nd the R2 in K&S’s Model 2 in their Table 1 
that supposedly replicates our “main” model is .086, yet our nonlinear specification always 
produces greater explanatory power.” It is interesting to observe that when Jacobs reestimated the 
models from J&C using the corrected exposure variable, the pseudo-R2 values dropped 
precipitously from approximately .470 to between .136 and .155 (excluding Jacobs’ Model 7 in 
which he includes the exposure variable on the right-hand side of the equation and greatly inflates 
the R2). While higher than our R2 value of .086, Jacobs’ R2 values are nevertheless very low 
suggesting that J&C’s and Jacobs’ models (as well as ours) do not provide a very good fit to the 
data. Additional analyses incorporating other important explanatory variables are in order. 
 
Additional Regression Analyses 
 Jacobs’ comment focuses on four methodological limitations of our analysis; entering 
percent divorced linearly instead of nonlinearly, entering a single regional dummy instead of three 
regional dummies, measuring the independents in 1989/1990 while the dependent variable spanned 
the years 1985-1995, and generally failing to replicate his “main” regression models. 
 In response, Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 test whether adding percent divorced nonlinearly and 
the additional regional dummy variables change our original findings regarding the insignificance 
of the presence of black mayors for murders of police 1985-1995 (K&S, 2009, Table 3, Model 1). 
To address Jacobs’ concern with temporal ordering, these models are then reestimated using a 
dependent variable aggregated for the years 1991-2000 with independents measured at 1989/1990 
(Models 3 and 4 in Table 1). Table 2 presents seven regression models that replicate J&C’s “main” 
models using the outcome for 1991-2000.  
 
Table 1 about here 
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 Model 1 in Table 1 estimates K&S’s original model (Model 1 in Table 3) replacing the 
regional dummy indicator Northeast with the three regional dummy variables South, West and 
Midwest and replacing the linear measure of percent divorced with dummy indicators of the second 
through fifth quintiles. Model 2 in Table 1 replaces the dummy indicators of percent divorced with 
percent divorced and its square as an additional test for nonlinear effects. As can be seen, these 
modifications do not change our original conclusion that the presence of black mayors is unrelated 
to killings of police for the years 1985-1995. Interestingly, the average number of black city council 
members retains it statistical significance in both models.  
Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 repeat the analysis using the number of police killed for the years 
1991-2000. Again, the black mayor variable is noncontributory. Although the black council variable 
is insignificant when using Jacobs’ dummy coding of percent divorced, it retains its significance 
when percent divorced and its square is used instead (Model 4). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
  
Table 2 presents a series of models that replicate J&C’s “main” models, with the exceptions 
that model 4 does not include crowding and we include four dummies based on quintiles of percent 
divorced instead of three (we also tested J&C’s version using three dummies but conclusions were 
unchanged). Again, the presence of black mayors is not statistically significant at the conventional p 
= .05 level (1-tailed tests) in any model, though several p-values are less than .10. However, when 
we add the average number of black city council members to these models (results not shown), the 
presence of black mayors is not nearly statistically significant even at the .10 level.  
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Conclusions 
 We agree with Jacobs’ statement that “…the corrected results presented here show that 
either the dummy or quadratic nonlinear specifications they ignore are necessary to produce 
accurate findings” (p. 8). However, our view is that this is the precise problem with J&C’s and 
Jacobs’ findings regarding the effect of the presence of black mayors. J&C justified the inclusion of 
a nonlinear specification of percent divorced based on an arbitrary maximization of its explanatory 
power and not based on Jacobs’ ex post facto argument that it is necessary to produce “correct 
results,” i.e., to produce a statistically significant effect for the presence of black mayors (since 
black mayors was also significant when the linear specification of percent divorced was included in 
J&C’s models). J&C’s nonlinear percent divorced variable is further arbitrary since its inclusion 
was based on link tests and an analysis of residuals from a misspecified regression model to begin 
with.  Our additional analyses addressing the methodological critiques raised in Jacobs’ comment 
confirmed our original conclusions. Thus, the evidence to date suggests the effect of the black 
mayor variable is not robust to model specification or data employed, which was the point of our 
original article. In addition to using more sophisticated analytic techniques such as panel or other 
models, future testing using improved black mayor measures and additional explanatory variables 
beyond those employed by J&C and K&S should help inform this debate. 
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Table 1. K&S Poisson Regression Models of Police Homicides Adding Regions and  
              Nonlinear Terms for Percentage Divorced 
 Y = 1985 - 1995 Y = 1991 - 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B B B B 
South 1.597 
1.440 
1.253 
 1.014* 
0.980 
2.850 
1.429 
0.960 
0.987 
1.094 
0.984 
  0.958* 
  1.067† 
1.378 
0.912 
0.892 
---- 
---- 
0.872 
0.998 
-10.279*** 
  1.560† 
1.561 
1.254 
  1.015* 
0.986 
2.574 
  1.355† 
0.956 
0.994 
1.160 
0.970 
  0.956* 
---- 
---- 
---- 
---- 
1.609 
0.975 
0.860 
0.998 
-11.930*** 
      2.534***        1.560† 
West       2.697***        1.561 
Midwest       2.138**        1.254 
Percent black       1.012**        1.015* 
Black change       0.991        0.986 
B/W income       0.745        2.574† 
Violent crime rate       1.238        1.355† 
Population structure       0.921**        0.956 
Economic conditions       0.973        0.994 
Racial segregation       1.203        1.160 
Black mayor       1.084        0.970 
Black council       0.971        0.956* 
Percent divorced Q2       0.550* ---- 
Percent divorced Q3       0.638† ---- 
Percent divorced Q4       0.531** ---- 
Percent divorced Q5       0.647† ---- 
Percent divorced         ----        1.610 
Percent divorced sq.         ----        0.975 
Black police       0.757        0.860 
Justifiable killings       0.679†        0.998 
Constant      -8.607***    -11.930*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 .077 .073 .109 .073 
Notes: † ≤ .10, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests based on robust standard errors, 
two-tailed tests used for Segregation); Bs are incidence rate ratios (i.e., exponentiated 
regression coefficients); the number of sworn field officers entered as the offset to control 
for unequal exposure; constants are not exponentiated. 
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Table 2. Poisson Regression Models of Police Homicides 1991-2000 Using J&C’s Specifications 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variable       B      B       B       B      B      B     B 
Percent black  1.009**  1.019*  1.012  1.019*  1.015†  1.012  1.019* 
B/W income  0.524  0.552  0.757  0.553  0.942  1.019  0.528 
Ln violent crime rate  1.073  1.076    ----  1.082  1.194  1.086  1.072 
Population  0.998†  0.999†  0.998  0.999  0.998  0.998  0.999 
Population2  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Segregation  0.748  0.667  0.958  0.680  1.704  1.121  0.716 
Black mayor 1990  1.298†  1.347†  1.324  1.349†  1.388†  1.363†  1.353† 
%  divorced  1.038    ----    ----    ----    ----    ----    ---- 
%  divorced Q2    ----  0.979  1.056  0.976  0.589†  0.959  0.981 
%  divorced Q3    ----  1.095  1.089  1.099  0.660  1.067  1.138 
%  divorced Q4    ----  1.083  1.064  1.086  0.627  1.039  1.099 
%  divorced Q5    ----  1.234  1.213  1.235  0.662  1.148  1.260 
%  black x pop > 25000    ----  0.991†  0.992†  0.991†  0.992†  0.991†  0.991† 
Growth in % black    ----  0.980  0.986  0.980  1.001  0.995  0.980 
Ln murder rate    ----    ----  1.410†    ----    ----    ----    ---- 
Ln robbery rate    ----    ----  0.778    ----    ----    ----    ---- 
Ln percent poverty    ----    ----    ----  0.970    ----    ----    ---- 
South    ----    ----    ----    ----  0.957    ----    ---- 
Midwest    ----    ----    ----    ----  0.756    ----    ---- 
Northeast    ----    ----    ----    ----  0.344*    ----    ---- 
% white fem-headed fam    ----    ----    ----    ----    ----  0.922    ---- 
% black fem-headed fam    ----    ----    ----    ----    ----  0.997    ---- 
% unemployed    ----    ----    ----    ----    ----  1.052    ---- 
Justifiable killings    ----    ----    ----    ----    ----   ----   0.881 
Constant  -7.369***     -7.159***  -6.193***  -7.137***  -8.103*** -7.221*** -7.330*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 .067 .073 .078 .073 .092 .075 .075 
Notes: † ≤ .10, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests based on robust standard errors, two-tailed tests used for 
Segregation); Bs are incidence rate ratios (i.e., exponentiated regression coefficients); the number of sworn field officers 
entered as the offset to control for unequal exposure; constants are not exponentiated.  
Model key: 
  Model 1 = J&C Table 2, Model 2 
  Model 2 = J&C Table 2, Model 5 
  Model 3 = J&C Table 3, Model 1 
  Model 4 = J&C Table 3, Model 2 (excluding crowding) 
  Model 5 = J&C Table 3, Model 3 
  Model 6 = J&C Table 3, Model 4 
  Model 7 = J&C Table 3, Model 5 
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